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How are our brains fimctionally organized to achieve adaptive behavior in a changing world? 
This article presents one alternative to the computer metaphor suggesting that brains are 
organized into independent modules. Evidence is reviewed that brains are organized into parallel 
processing streams with co1nplementmy properties. Hierarchical interactions within each stream 
and parallel interactions between streams create coherent behavioral representations that 
overcmne the comp!ementwy dqficiencies ()j' each stream and support unitmy conscious 
experiences. This per.1pective suggests how brain design reflects the organization (~j' the physical 
world with which brains interact. Ewmples from perception, learning, cognition, and action are 
described, and theoretical concepts and mechanisms by which complementarity is accomplished 
are presented. 
In one simple view, our brains are proposed to possess independent modules, as in a digital 
computer, and we see by processing perceptual qualities such as form, color, and motion using 
these independent modules. The brain's organization into processing streams' supports the idea 
that brain processing is specialized, but it does not, in itself, imply that these streams contain 
independent modules. Independent modules should be able to fully compute their particular 
processes on their own. Much perceptual data argue against the existence of independent modules, 
however, because strong interactions are known to occur between perceptual qualities'·"- For 
example, changes in perceived form or color can cause changes in perceived motion, and 
conversely; and changes in perceived brightness can cause changes in perceived depth, and 
conversely. How and why do these qualities interact? An answer to this question is needed to 
determine the functional and computational units that govern behavior as we know it. 
The present article reviews evidence that the brain's processing streams compute 
complementmy properties. Each stream's properties are related to those of a complementary stream 
much as a lock fits its key, or two pieces of a puzzle fit together. It is also suggested how the 
mechanisms that enable each stream to compute one set of properties prevent it from computing a 
complementary set of properties. As a result, each of these streams exhibits complementary 
strengths and weaknesses. How, then, do these complementary properties get synthesized into a 
consistent behavioral experience? It is proposed that interactions between these processing streams 
overcome their complementary deficiencies and generate behavioral properties that realize the unity 
of conscious experiences. In this sense, pairs of complementary streams are the functional units 
because only through their interactions can key behavioral properties be competently computed. As 
illustrated below, these interactions may be used to explain many of the ways in which perceptual 
qualities are known to influence each other. Thus, although analogies like a key fitting its lock, or 
puzzle pieces fitting together, are suggestive, they do not fully capture the dynamism of what 
complementarity means in the brain. I will suggest below that the concept of pairs of 
complementary processes brings new precision to the popular idea that both functional 
specialization and functional integration occur in the brain. Table I summaries some pairs of 
complementary processes that will be described herein. 
Why docs the brain often need several processing stages to form each processing stream? 
Accumulating evidence suggests that these stages realize a process of hierarchical resolution of 
uncertainty. 'Uncertainty' here means that computing one set of properties at a given stage can 
suppress inl~lrmation about a different set of properties at that stage. As I will illustrate below, these 
uncertainties are proposed to be overcome by using more than one processing stage to form a 
stream. Overcoming informational uncertainty utilizes both hierarchical interactions within the 
stream and the parallel interactions between streams that overcome their complementary 
deficiencies. The computational unit is thus not a single processing stage; it is, rather, proposed to 
be an ensemble of processing stages that interact within and between complementary processing 
streams. 
According to this view, the organization of the brain obeys principles of uncertainty and 
complementarity, as does the physical world with which brains interact, and of which they form a 
part. This atticle suggests that these principles reflect each brain's role as a self-organizing 
measuring device in the world, and (~j' the world. Appropriate principles of uncertainty and 
complementarity may better explain the brain's functional organization than the simpler view of 
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computationally independent modules. Experimental and theoretical evidence for complementary 
processes and processing streams are described below. 
SOME COMPLEMENTARY PAIRS OF BRAIN PROCESSES 
Boundary 
Boundary 
'What' learning and matching 
Attentive learning 
Object tracking 
Color 
Vergence 
Motor expectation 
Sensory cortical representation 
Working memory order 
Surface 
Motion 
'Where' learning and matching 
Orienting search 
Optic flow navigation 
Luminance 
Spherical angle 
Volitional speed 
Learned motivational feedback 
Working memory rate 
Table I 
In most of these cases, evidence for the existence of processing streams and their role in 
behavior has been developed by many investigators. The hrct that pairs of these streams exhibit 
complementary computational properties, and that successive processing stages realize a 
hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, has only gradually become clear through neural modeling, 
primarily from our group and colleagues. Through a large number of such modeling studies, it 
gradually became clear that different pairs of streams realize different combinations of 
complementary properties, as illustrated below. As of this writing, so many streams seem to follow 
this pattern that I now suggest that complementarity may be a general principle of brain design. 
Complementary boundaries and surfaces in visual form perception 
Visual processing, from the retina through the inferotcmporal and parietal cortices, provides 
excellent examples of parallel processing streams (Figure I). What evidence is there to suggest that 
these streams compute complementary properties, and how is this clone? A neural theory, called 
FACADE (Form-And-Color-And-DEpth) theory, proposes that perceptual boundaries are formed 
in the LGN-Blob-Thin Stripe-V4 stream while perceptual surfctces are formed in the LGN-
Interblob-lnterstripe-V 4 stream7• Many experiments have supported this prediction'·'". 
FACADE theory suggests how and why perceptual boundaries and perceptual surfaces 
compute complementary properties. Figure 2A illustrates three pairs of complementary properties 
using the illusory contour percept of a Kanizsa square". In response to both images of this figure, 
boundaries form inwardly between cooperating pairs of incomplete disk (or pac man) inducers to 
form the sides of the square. These boundaries arc oriented to form in a collinear fashion between 
like-oriented inducers. 'fhe square boundary in Figure 2A can be both seen and recognized because 
of the enhanced illusory brightness of the Kanizsa square. In contrast, the square boundary in 
Figure 2B can be recognized even though it is not visible; that is, there is no brightness or color 
difference on either side of the boundary. Figure 213 shows that some boundaries can be recognized 
even though they are invisible. FACADE theory predicts that all boundaries are invisible within the 
boundary stream, which is proposed to occur in the lnterblob cortical processing stream (Figure I). 
This prediction has not yet been directly tested through a neurophysiological experiment, although 
several studies have shown the distinctness of a perceptual grouping, such as an illusory contour, 
can be dissociated from the visible stimulus contrast that is associated with it''·" 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of anatomical 
connections and neuronal selectivitiesof early 
visual areas in the macaque monkey. LON = 
lateral geniculate nucleus (parvocellular 
[parvo] and magnocellular [magno] divisions. 
Divisions of visual areas VI and V2; blob = 
cytochrome oxidase blob regions, interblob = 
cytochrome oxidase-poor regions 
surrounding the blobs,4B = lamina4B, thin= 
thin (narrow) cytochrome oxidase stripes, 
interstripe= cytochrome oxidase-poor regions 
between the thin and thick stripes, thick = 
thick (wide)cytochromeoxidase stripes, V3 = 
Visua!Area3, V4 = Visua!Area(s) 4, and MT 
= Middle Temporal area. Areas V2, V3, V4, 
and MT have connections to other areas not 
explicitly represented here. Area V3 may also 
receive projections from V2 intcrstripes or 
thin stripes. Heavy lines indicate robust 
primary connections, and thin lines indicate 
weaker, more variable connections. Dotted 
lines represent observed connections that 
require additional verification. Icons: rainbow 
tuned and/or opponent wavelength 
Retina selectivity (incidence at least 40'Yo), angle 
symbol = orientation selectivity (incidence at 
least 20%), spectacles= binocular disparity selectivity and/or strong binocular interactions (V2; 
incidence at least 20%), and right-pointinguTow =direction of motion selectivity(incidence at least 
20% ). Adapted with permission from Reference 1. 
This invisible boundary in Figure 2B can be traced to the fact that its vertical boundaries 
form between black and while inducers that possess opposite contrast polarity with respect to the 
gray background. The same is true of the boundary around the gray disk in Figure 2C. In this 
figure, the gray disk lies in front ofa textured background whose contrasts with respect to the disk 
reverse across space. In order to build a boundary around the entire disk, despite these contrast 
reversals, the boundary system pools signals from opposite contrast polaritic;ut each position. This 
pooling process renders the boundary system output insensitive to contrast polarity. The boundary 
system hereby loses its ability to represent visible colors or brightnesses, since its output cannot 
signal the diffcrencebctwccn clark and light. It is in this sense that "all boundaries arc invisible". 
These properties ofboundary completion are summarized in Figure 3. Figure 2D illustrates another 
invisiblcbounclary that can be consciously recognized. 
If boundaries arc invisible,then how do we sec anything? FACADE theory predicts that 
visible properties of a scene arc represented by the surface processing stream, which is predicted to 
occur within the Blob cortical stream (Figure I). A key step in representing a visible surface is 
calledfilling-in Why docs a surface filling-in ]Jrocess occur? An early ~t~?e of surface processing 
compensates for vanablc !llummatwn, or 'discounts the !llummant I.- 5 ll1 order to prevent 
illuminant variations, which can change from moment to moment, from distorting all percepts. 
Discounting the illuminant attenuates color and brightness signals except ncar regions of 
sufficiently rapid surface change, such as edges or texture gradients, which are relatively 
uncontaminated by illuminant variations. Later stages of surface formation fill in the attenuated 
regions with these rclativclyuncontaminatcdcolor and brightness signals, and do so at the correct 
rclativedepths from the observerthrough a process called surface capture. This multi-stage process 
is an example of hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, because the later filling-in stage overcomes 
uncertainticsabout brightness and color that werccausecl by discounting the illuminant at an earlier 
processing stage. 
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Figure 2. A Kanizsa square (A) and a reverse-
contrast Kanizsa square (B). The emergent 
Kanizsa square can be seen and recognized 
because of the enhanced illusory brightness within 
the illusory square. The reverse-contrast Kanizsa 
square can be recognized but not seen. (C) The 
boundary of the gray disk can form around its 
entire circumference even though the relative 
contrast between the disk and the white and black 
background squares reverses periodically along 
the circumference. (D) The vertical illusory 
contour that forms at the ends of the horizontal 
lines can be consciously recognized even though it 
cannot be seen by virtue of any contrast difference 
between it and the background. 
How do the illuminant-discounted signals 
fill-in an entire region? Filling-in behaves like a 
diffusion of brightness across space"·". In 
response to the display in Figure 3, filling-in 
spreads outwardly from the individual blue inducers in all directions. Its spread is thus unoriented. 
How is this spread of activation contained? FACADE theory predicts that signals from the 
boundary stream to the surface stream define the regions within which filling-in is restricted. This 
prediction has not yet been neurophysiologically tested. Without these boundary signals, filling-in 
would dissipate across space, and no surface percept could form. Invisible boundaries hereby 
indirectly assure their own visibility through their interactions with the surface stream. 
For example, in Figure 2A, the square boundary is induced by four black pac man disks that 
are all less luminant than the white background. In the surface stream, discounting the illuminant 
causes these pac men to induce local brightness contrasts within the boundary of the square. At a 
subsequent processing stage, these brightness contrasts trigger surface filling-in within the square 
boundary. The filled-in square is visible as a brightness difference because the filled-in activity level 
within the square differs from the filled-in activity of the surrounding region. Filling-in can lead to 
visible percepts because it is sensitive to contrast polarity. These three properties of surface filling-
in are summarized in Figure 3. They are easily seen to be complementary to the corresponding 
properties of boundary completion. 
In Figure 2B, the opposite polarities of the two pairs of pac men with respect to the gray 
background lead to approximately equal filled-in activities inside and outside the square, so the 
boundary can be recognized but not seen. In Figure 2D, the white background can fill-in uniformly 
on both sides of the vertical boundary, so no visible contrast difference is seen. 
These remarks just begin the analysis of filling-in. Even in the seemingly simple case of the 
Kanizsa square, one often perceives a square hovering in front of four partially occluded circular 
disks, which seem to be completed behind the square. FACADE theory predicts how surface 
filling-in is organized to help such figure-ground percepts to occur, in response to both two-
dimensional pictures and three-dimensional scenes'·' . 
In summary, boundary and surface formation illustrate two key principles of brain 
organization: hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, and complementary interstream interactions. 
Figure 3 summarizes three pairs of complementary properties of the boundary and surface streams. 
Hierarchical resolution of uncertainty is illustrated by surface filling-in: Discounting the illuminant 
creates uncertainty by suppressing surface color and brightness signals except near surface 
discontinuities. Higher stages of filling-in complete the surface representation using properties that 
are complementary to those whereby boundaries are formed, guided by signals from these 
boundaries'·"·". 
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BOUNDARY COMPLETION 
oriented 
inward 
insensitive to contrast polarity 
SURFACE FILLING-IN 
unoriented 
outward 
sensitive to contrast polarity 
Complementary form and motion interactions 
Figure 3. In this example of 
neon color spreading, the color 
in the blue contours spreads in 
all directions until it fills the 
square illusory contour. An 
explanation of this percept is 
given in reference (7). Three 
complementary computational 
properties of visual boundaries 
and surfaces are also described. 
Boundaries are predicted to be 
completed within a Boundary 
Contour System (BCS) that 
passes through the Interblobs 
of cortical area V 1, whereas 
surfaces are filled-in within a 
Feature Contour System (FCS) 
that passes through the Blobs 
of cortical area V 1 (see Fig.!). 
A third parallel processinfi stream, passing through LGN-4B-Thick Stripe-MT, processes 
motion information (Figure 1) 19-•• Why does a separate motion stream exist? In what sense are 
form and motion computations complementary? What do interactions between form and motion 
accomplish from a functional point of view? Modeling work suggests how these streams and their 
mutual interactions compensate for complementary deficiencies of each stream towards generating 
percepts of moving-form-in-depth"·"- Such motion percepts arc called 'formotion' percepts 
because they arise f1·om a form-motion interaction. 
The form system uses orientationally tuned computations while the motion system 
uses directionally tuned computations. In the formotion model, the processing of form by the 
boundary stream uses orientationally tuned cells24 to generate emergent object representations, such 
as the Kanizsa square (Figure 2). Such emergent boundary and surface representations, rather than 
just the energy impinging on our retinas, define the form percepts of which we are consciously 
aware. Precise orientationally tuned comparisons of left eye and right eye inputs arc used to 
compute sharp estimates of the relative depth of an object from its observer25·2(', and thereby to form 
three-dimensional boundary and surface representations of objects separated from their 
backgrounds'. 
How is this orientation information used by the motion stream? An object can contain 
contours of many different orientations which all move in the same direction as part of the object's 
motion. Both psychophysical and neurophysiological experiments have shown that the motion 
stream pools information from many orientations that are moving in the same direction to generate 
precise estimates of a moving object's direction and speed 19-2'- 27 ' 29 . Lesions of the form system 
also show that, on its own, the motion system can make only coarse depth estimates"'·''. Thus it 
seems reasonable that the orientationally tuned form system generates emergent representations of 
forms with precise depth estimates, whereas the directionally tuned motion system- on its own -
can generate only coarse depth estimates. In this conception, orientation and direction are 
complementary properties, since orientation is computed parallel to a contour, whereas, at least in 
the absence of contextual constraints, direction is computed perpendicular to it12 
How do the emergent object boundaries that arc computed with precise depth estimates in 
the form stream get injected into the motion stream and thereby enable the motion stream to track 
emergent object representations in depth? How does the motion stream pool information across 
space from multiple oriented contours to generate precise estimates of an object's direction and 
speed? These are large questions with complex answers on which many investigators are working. 
Classical computational models of motion detection involving Reichardt-like or motion-energy 
6 
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mechanisms have focused on the recovery of local motion directions"·". Cells in motion 
processinR areas like MT, however, are sensitive to both the direction and the speed of moving 
patterns20• 6 . Indeed, both direction and speed estimates are needed to track moving objects. More 
recent models have proposed how motion signals can be differentiated and pooled over multiple 
orientations and spatial locations to form global estimates of both object direction and speed17• 
The present discussion of motion perception focuses on how the complementary 
uncertainties of the form and motion streams may be overcome by their interaction. There is 
evidence for an interstream interaction from area V2 of the form stream to area MT of the motion 
stream (Figure 1 ). This interaction could enable form representations to be tracked by the motion 
stream at their correct depths as they move through time. A model of this formotion interaction has 
successfully simulated many perceptual and brain data about motion perception22·2J.J?.J8 This model 
predicts an important functional role for percepts of long-range apparent motion, whereby observers 
perceive continuous motion between properly timed but spatially stationary flashes of color or 
brightness. These continuous motion interpolations can be used to track targets, such as prey and 
predators, that intermittently disappear as they move at variable rates behind occluding cover, such 
as bushes and trees in a forest. The "flashes" are the intermittent appearances of the prey or 
predator. This prediction has not yet been tested neurophysiologically. 
• • 
• • 
Figure 4. Images used to demonstrate that apparent 
motion of illusory figures arises through interactions of 
the static illusory figures, but not from the inducing 
elements themselves. Frame I (row I) is followed by 
Frame 2 (row 2) in the same spatial locations. With 
correctly chosen image sizes, distances, and temporal 
displacements, an illusory square is seen to move 
continuously from the inducers in the left picture of 
Frame I to the inducers in the right picture of Frame 2. 
Reprinted with permission from Reference 39 
Figure 4 illustrates an experimental display that 
vividly illustrates such a formotion interaction. In 
Frame I, the pac men at the left side of the Figure define a Kanizsa square via the boundary 
completion process that takes place within the form stream. In Frame 2, the pac men arc replaced by 
closed disks, and a square region is cleared in the line array to the right. As a result, an illusory 
square forms adjacent to the line ends. The pac men and line arrays were designed so that none of 
their features could be matched. Only the emergent squares have matching features. When Frame 2 
is turned on right after Frame 1 is turned off, the square appears to move continuously from the pac 
man array to the line array. This percept is an example of apparent motion, since nothing in the 
images actually moves. The percept is a "double illusion" because both the emergent forms and 
their motions arc visual illusions. The theory suggests that the illusory square boundaries arc 
generated in the form stream before being injected into the motion stream, where they are the 
successive "flashes" that generate a wave of apparent motion. Such displays, and their theoretical 
explanation, also illustrate how the form system can help to create percepts of moving objects 
whose boundaries are not explicitly defined within individual frames of a display. 
Complementary expectation learning and matching during 'what' and 'whet·e' processing 
Complementary form and motion processing are proposed to be part of a larger design for 
complementary processing whereby objects in the world are cognitively recognized, spatially 
localized, and acted upon. The form stream inputs to the inferotemporal cortex, whereas the motion 
stream inputs to the parietal cortex (Figure I). Many cognitive neuroscience experiments have 
supported the hypotheses of Ungerleider and Mishkin40'41 and of Goodale and Milner42 that 
inferotemporal cortex and its cortical projections learn to categorize and recognize what objects are 
in the world, whereas the parietal cortex and its cortical projections learn to determine where they 
arc and how to deal with them by locating them in space, tracking them through time, and directing 
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actions towards them. This design thus separates sensory and cognitive processing from spatial and 
motor processing. 
These hypotheses have not, however, noted that sensory and cognitive learning processes 
are complementary to spatial and motor learning processes on a mechanistic level. Neural modeling 
has clarified how sensory and cognitive processes solve a key problem, called the 'stability-
plasticity dilcmma' 43' 45 , and can thus rapidly and stably learn about the world throughout life 
without catastrophically forgetting our previous experiences. In other words, we remain plastic and 
open to new experiences without risking the stability of previously learned memories. This type of 
fast stable learning enables us to become experts at dealing with changing environmental 
conditions: Old knowledge representations can be refined by changing contingencies, and new ones 
built up, without destroying the old ones due to catastrophic forgetting. 
On the other hand, catastrophic forgetting is a good property for spatial and motor learning. 
W c have no need to remember all the spatial and motor representations (notably motor maps and 
gains) that we used when we were children. In fact, the parameters that controlled our small 
childhood limbs would cause rm~jor problems if they continued to control our larger and stronger 
adult limbs. This forgetting property of the motor system should not be confused with the more 
stable sensory and cognitive representations with which they interact that, for example, help us to 
ride a bike after years of disuse. 
These distinct 'what' and 'where' memory properties arc proposed to follow from 
complementary mechanisms whereby these systems learn expectations about the world, and match 
these expectations against world data. To sec how we usc a sensory or cognitive expectation, 
suppose you were asked to "find the yellow ball within one-half second, and you will win a 
$10,000 prize". Activating an expectation of 'yellow balls' enables more rapid detection of a 
yellow ball, and with a more energetic neural response, than if you were not looking for it. Neural 
correlates of such excitatory priming and gain control have been reported by several laboratories"'· 
52
• Sensory and cognitive top-down expectations hereby lead to excitatory rnatching with 
confirmatory bottom-up data. On the other hand, mismatch between top-down expectations and 
bottom-up data can suppress the mismatched part of the bottom-up data, and thereby start to focus 
attention upon the matched, or expected, part of the bottom-up data. This sort of excitatory matching 
and altcntional focusing of bottom-up data with top-down expectations is proposed to generate 
resonant brain states that support conscious experiences"·'". Paradoxical data about conscious 
perceptual experiences from several modalities have been explained as emergent properties of such 
resonant states". 
In contrast, a motor expectation represents where we want to move, such as to the position 
where our hand can grasp a desired object. Such a motor expectation is matched against where the 
hand is. After the hand moves to the desired position, no further movement is required, and 
movement stops. Motor expectations hereby control inhihitorv matching. Inhibitory matching does 
not lead to brain resonance, so motor processing is not conscious. In summary, in the present 
theory, sensory and cognitive matching is excitatory, whereas spatial and motor matching is 
inhibitory. These are complementary properties. 
8 
3/15/00 
V2 
( 
Vl 
LGN 
2/3 
4 
6 
Figure 5, The LAMINART model 
synthesis of bottom-up, top-down, and 
horizontal interactions in LON, VI, and 
V2. Cells and connections with open 
symbols denote preattentive excitatory 
mechanisms that are involved in 
perceptual grouping. Solid black 
symbols denote inhibitory mechanisms. 
Dashed symbols denote top-down 
attentional mechanisms. 
Recent modeling work predicts some of 
the cells and circuits that are proposed to 
carry out these complementary types of 
matching. For example, recent modeling 
has suggested how top-down sensory 
matching is controlled in visual cortex, 
notably from cortical area V2 to VI, and 
by extension in other sensory and 
2/3 cognitive neocortical circuits51 ·54• This 
top-clown circuit is part of a larger model 
of how bottom-up, top-down, and 
horizontal interactions are organized 
within the laminar circuits of visual 
cortex; see Figure 5. The circuit 
4 
6 
generates top-down outputs from cortical 
layer 6 of V2 that activate, via a possibly 
polysynaptic pathway, layer 6 of VI. 
Cells in layer 6 of VI, in turn, activate an 
on-center off-surround circuit to layer 4 
of VI. (Sec below for more discussion of 
on-center oil-surround circuits.) The on-
center is predicted to have a modulatory 
effect on layer 4, due to the balancing of excitatory and inhibitory inputs to layer 4 within the on-
center. The inhibitory signals in the off-surround can suppress unattended visual features. This top-
down circuit realizes a type offl;lded feedback, whereby feedback inputs from V2 are folded back 
into the feed forward f1ow of information from layer 6-to-4 of VI. The modulatory nature of the 
layer 6-to-4 connections helps to explain a curious fact about bottom-up cortical design: despite the 
fact that the LON activates layer 6 of VI in a bottom-up fashion, a separate, direct excitatory 
pathway exists from LON to layer 4 of VI. It is predicted that this direct pathway is needed to 
enable the LON to drive layer 4 cells to suprathresholcl activity levels, because the indirect LGN-6-4 
pathway is modulatory. The modeling articles summarize neurophysiological, anatomical, and 
psychophysical experiments that are consistent with these predictions. 
Recent modeling work also predicts some of the cells and circuits that are proposed to carry 
out top-clown motor matching, notably in cortical areas 4 and 555.5<'. Inhibitory matching is predicted 
to occur between a Target Position Vector (TPV) that represents where we want to move our arm, 
and a Present Position Vector (PPV) that computes an outf1ow representation of where the arm is 
now (Figure 6). This comparison is proposed to occur at Difference Vector (DV) cells in cortical 
area 5, which compute how far, and in what direction, the arm is commanded to move. This 
Difference Vector is, in turn, predicted to be transmitted to cortical area 4, where is multiplicatively 
gated by a GO signal that is under volitional control. Turning on the GO signal determines whether 
the limb will move, and its amplitude scales the speed of movement. The product of DV and GO 
9 
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hereby determined a Desired Velocity Vector (DVV). Such a DV is predicted to be computed at 
area 5 phasic cells, and its corresponding DDV at area 4 phasic MT cells. The modeling articles 
summarize neurophysiological, anatomical, and psychophysical experiments that are consistent with 
these predictions. It should also be noted that various other cell types within cortical areas 4 and 5 
do not do inhibitory matching, and may even support resonant states. 
rostral------+ caudal 
area 4 
X 
+ 
DVV 
DV 
+ + + 
y• II Ia 
Figure 6. The VITE circuit model. 
Thick connections represent the 
kinematic feedback control aspect of 
the model, with thin connections 
representing additional 
compensatory circuitry. GO, 
scaleable gating signal; DVV, 
desired velocity vector; OPV, 
J.-- TPV outflow position vector; OFPV, 
+ outflow force + position vector; 
SFV, static force vector; IFV, inertial 
force vector; CBM, assumed 
cerebello-cortical input to the IFV 
stage; PPV, perceived position 
vector; DV, difference vector; TPV, 
target position vector; "{', dynamic 
gamma tnotoneuron; y', static 
gamma motoneuron; Cl., alpha motoneuron; !a, type Ia afferent fiber; II, type II afferent fiber 
(position error feedback); c.s., central sulcus; i.p.s., intraparietal sulcus. The symbol + represents 
excitation,- represents inhibition, x represents multiplicative gating, and+ f represents integration. 
The learning processes that accompany these complementary types of matching are also 
proposed to exhibit complementary properties. Learning within the sensory and cognitive domain is 
often match learning. Match learning occurs only if a good enough match occurs between active 
top-down expectations and bottom-up information. When such an approximate match occurs, 
previously stored knowledge can be refined. If novel information cannot form a good enough match 
with the expectations that arc read-out by previously learned recognition categories, then a memory 
search is triggered that leads to selection and learning of a new recognition category, rather than 
catastrophic forgetting of an old one43"45 . In contrast, learning within spatial and motor processes is 
proposed to be misnzatch learning that continuously updates sensory-motor maps" or the gains of 
sensory-motor commands'"'9 Thus both learning and matching within the 'what' and 'where' 
streams may have complementary properties. As a result, we can stably learn what is happening in a 
changing world, thereby solving the stability-plasticity dilemma41 ·45 , while adaptively updating our 
representations of where objects are and how to act upon them using bodies whose parameters 
change continuously through time57.59 . 
Complementary attentive-leaming and orienting-scm·ch 
Match learning has the great advantage that it leads to stable memories in response to 
changing environmental conditions. It also has a potentially disastrous disadvantage, however: If 
you can only learn when there is a good enough match between bottom-np data and learned top-
down expectations, then how do you ever learn anything that you do not already know? Some 
popular learning models, such as back propagation, try to escape this problem by assuming that the 
brain does only 'supervised learning'. During supervised learning, an explicit correct answer, or 
teaching signal, is provided in response to every input. This teaching signal forces learning to track 
the correct answer. Such a model cannot learn if an explicit answer is not provided. It appears, 
however, that much human and animal learning, especially during the crucial early years of life, 
takes place in a relatively unsupervised fashion. 
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Other models do allow 'unsupervised learning' to occur. Here, the key problem to be 
solved is, that if a teacher is not available to force the selection and learning of a representation that 
can map onto a correct answer, then the internal dynamics of the model must do so on their own. In 
order to escape the problem of not being able to learn something that one docs not already know, 
some of these models assume that we do already know (or, more exactly, have internal 
representations for) everything that we may ever wish to know, and that experience just selects and 
amplifies these rcpresentations60 . These models depend upon the bottom-up filtering of inputs, and 
a very large number of internal representations that respond to these filtered inputs, to provide 
enough memory to represent whatever may happen. Having such a large number of representations 
leads to a combinatorial explosion, with an implausibly large memory. Thus, although using a very 
large number of representations can help with the problem of catastrophic forgetting, it creates 
other, equally serious, problems instead. Other unsupervised learning models shut down learning as 
time goes on in order to avoid catastrophic forgclling61 • 
I propose that these problems are averted in the brain through the use of another 
complementary interaction, which was briefly mentioned above. This complementary interaction 
helps to balance between processing the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected and the 
unexpected. It docs so using complementary processes of resonance and reset, which are predicted 
to subserve properties of attention and memory search, respectively. This interaction enables the 
brain to discover and stably learn new representations for novel events in an efficient way, without 
assuming that representations already exist for as yet unexperienced events. It hereby solves the 
combinatorial explosion while also solving the stability-plasticity dilemma. 
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Figure 7. Search for a recognition code within an 
ART learning circuit: (A) The input pattern I is 
instated across the feature detectors at level F, as a 
short term memory (STM) activity pattern X. 
Input I also nonspecifically activates the orienting 
subsystem A. STM pattern X is represented by 
the hatched pattern across F,. Pattern X both 
inhibits A and generates the output pattern S. 
Pattern S is multiplied by long term memory 
(LTM) traces, or learned adapative weights. These 
LTM-gated signals are added at F 2 nodes lo form 
the input pattern T, which activates the STM 
pattern Y across the recognition categories coded 
at level F2• (B) Pattern Y generates the lop-down 
output pattern U which is multiplied by lop-down 
LTM traces and added at F, nodes to form the 
prototype pattern V that encodes the learned 
expectation of the active F2 nodes. If V 
mismatches I at F 1, then a new STM activity 
pattern X* is generated at F,. X* is represented 
+ by the hatched pattern. It includes the features of I 
1---......l that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features are 
inhibited. The inactivated nodes corresponding to 
unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The reduction in total STM activity which occurs when X 
is transformed into X* causes a decrease in the total inhibition from F, to A. (C) If inhibition 
decreases sufficiently, A releases a nonspecific arousal wave to F;, which resets the STM pattern Y 
at F2• (D) After Y is inhibited, its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated 
al F 1• Enduring traces of the prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y at F2• If the 
top-down prototype due to Y also mismatches I at F,, then the search for an appropriate F2 code 
continues until a more appropriate F2 representation is selected. Then an attentive resonance 
develops and learning of the attended data is initiated. 
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[Reprinted with permission from reference [45].] 
One of these complementary subsystems is just the 'what' stream that was described above, 
with its top-down expectations that are matched against bottom-up inputs. When a recognition 
category activates a top-down expectation that achieves a good enough match with bottom-up data, 
this match process focuses attention upon those feature clusters in the bottom-up input that are 
expected (Figure 7). Experimental evidence for such matching and attentional processes has been 
found in neurophysiological data about perception and recognition48-'0·62. 66 • Many behavioral and 
neural data have been explained by assuming that such lop-down feedback processes can lead to 
resonant brain states that play a key role in dynamically stabilizing both developmental and learning 
processes"·''·"·"'·"'. 
How does a sufficiently bad mismatch between an active top-down expectation and a 
bottom-up input drive a memory search, say because the input represents an unfamiliar type of 
experience? This mismatch within the attentional system is proposed to activate a complementary 
orient inK system, which is sensitive to unexpected and unfamiliar events. Output signals from the 
orienting system rapidly reset the recognition category that has been reading out the poorly 
matching top-down expectation (Figure 7B and 7C). The cause of the mismatch is hereby removed, 
thereby freeing the system to activate a different recognition category (Figure 7D). The reset event 
hereby triggers memory search, or hypothesis testing, which automatically leads to the selection of a 
recognition category that can better match the input. lf no such recognition category exists, say 
because the bottom-up input represents a truly novel experience, then the search process can 
automatically activate an as yet uncommitted population of cells, with which to learn about the novel 
information. This learning process works well under both unsupervised and supervised conditions. 
Supervision can force a search for new categories that may be culturally determined, and are not 
based on feature similarity alone. For example, separating the letters E and F into separate 
recognition categories is culturally determined; they are quite similar based on visual similarity 
alone. Taken together, the interacting processes of attentive-learning and orienting-search realize a 
type of error correction through hypothesis testing that can build an ever-growing, self-refining 
internal model of a changing world. 
The complementary attentive-learning and orienting-search subsystems and how they 
interact have been progressively developed since the 1970's within Adaptive Resonance Theory, or 
ART"··". Neurobiological data have elsewhere been reviewed in support of the ART hypothesis that 
the attentive-learning system includes such 'what' processing regions as infcrotemporal cortex and 
its projections in prefrontal cortex, whereas the orienting-search system includes circuits of the 
hippocampal system45 Data about mismatch cells in the hippocampal system are particularly 
relevant to this hypothesis 70 ART predicts that these interactions between infcrotemporal cortex and 
the hippocampal system during a mismatch event offset the inability of the 'what' processing 
stream to search for and learn appropriate new recognition codes on its own. This deficiency of the 
'what' stream has been used to predict how hippocampal lesions can lead to symptoms of amnesic 
memory"5 Because of their ability to learn stably in real-time about large amounts of information in 
a rapidly changing world, ART models have also been used in pattern recognition applications in 
technology 71 • 
Complementary additive and subtmctive intt·astream processing 
The two types of matching across the 'what' and 'where' processing streams use different 
combinations of excitatory and inhibitory neural signals. Complementary processes can also arise 
within a processing stream. Thus, a processing stream may be broken into complementary 
substreams. Several examples will now be mentioned wherein parallel combinations of additive and 
subtractive neural signals can be computed within a single processing stream. A classical example 
in the 'what' processing stream combines outputs from long-wave length (L) and medium wave-
length (M) retinal photoreceptors into parallel luminance (L + M) and color (L - M) channels". 
The color channels compute reflectances, or ratios, by discounting the illuminant, while the 
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luminance channel computes luminant energy. By using both channels, the illuminant can be 
discounted without throwing away information about luminant energy. 
lntrastream complementarity also seems to occur within the 'where' stream. Here, cortical 
area MT activates area MST (not shown in Figure I) on the way to parietal cortex. In macaque 
monkeys, the ventral part of MST helps to track moving visual objects, whereas dorsal MST helps 
to navigate in the world using global properties of optic flow 71 ' 74 • These tasks are behaviorally 
complementary: the former tracks an object moving in the world with respect to an observer, 
whereas the latter navigates a moving observer with respect to the world. The tasks are also 
neurophysiologically complementary: Neurons in ventral MST compute the relative motion of an 
object with respect to its background by subtracting background motion from object motion; 
whereas neurons in dorsal MST compute motions of a wide textured field by adding motion 
signals over a large visual domain74 • Corresponding to MST's breakdown into additive and 
subtractive subregions, area MT of owl monkeys possesses distinct bands and interbands75 • Band 
cells have additive receptive fields for visual navigation, whereas interband cells have subtractive 
receptive fields for computing object-relative motion. Modeling studies have shown how these 
complementary properties can be used, on the one hand, for visual navigation using optical t1ow 
information and, on the other hand, for predictive tracking of moving targets using smooth pursuit 
eye movements76'77 These studies make a number of neurophysiological predictions, including how 
the log polar mapping that is defined by the cortical magnification factor helps to achieve good 
navigational properties. A remarkable prediction is that the biologically observed spiral tuning 
curves that were found by Graziano et a/. 78 in cortical area MST maximize the amount of position 
in variance of which the positionally-variant log polar map is capable. 
lntrastream complementarity is also predicted to occur during sensory-motor control, or 
'how' processing. To see this, suppose that both eyes fixate an object that can be reached by the 
arms. Psychophysical79 and neurophysiological data"'·" suggest that the vergence of the two eyes, 
as they fixate the object, is used to estimate the object's radial distance, while the spherical angles 
that the eyes make relative to the observer's head estimate the object's angular position. Distance 
and angle arc mathematically independent properties of an object's position with respect to an 
observer. How does the brain compute the distance and angle to an object that the eyes are fixating? 
A neural model proposes how addition and subtraction can. again realize the necessary 
computations by exploiting the bilateral symmetry of the body''. In particular, eye movement 
control pathways give rise to parallel branches, called corollary discharges, that inform other brain 
systems of the present position of the eyes 11 • These outflow movement control pathways have an 
opponent organization to control the body's agonist and antagonist muscles. Neural modeling has 
mathematically proved that, when both eyes fixate an object, accurate spherical angle and vergence 
estimates of object position may be derived by adding and subtracting, respectively, the ocular 
corollary discharges that control the two eyes, while preserving their opponent relationships, at 
separate populations of cells57• 
These examples illustrate how a rich repertoire of complementary behavioral capabilities can 
be derived by doing "brain arithmetic", whereby outputs of a processing stage are segregated into 
additive and subtractive parallel computations at a subsequent processing stage. Such additive and 
subtractive combinations can occur both between processing streams and within a single processing 
stream. These simple computations generate very different behavioral properties when applied to 
different sensory inputs or different stages of a processing stream. The next sections illustrate 
several ways in which complementary multiplication and division operations may enter the brain's 
"arithmetic" repertoire. 
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Factorization of pattern and energy: ratio processing and synchrony 
Multiplication and division occur during processes that illustrate the general theme of how 
the brain achieves factorization C!{pattern and energ/1• 'Pattern' here refers to the hypothesis that 
the brain's functional units of short-term representation of information, and of long-term learning 
about this information, are distributed patterns of activation and of synaptic weight, respectively, 
across a neuronal network. 'Energy' refers to the mechanisms whereby pattern processing is 
turned on and off by activity-dependent modulatory processes. 
Why do pattern and energy need to be processed separately? Why cannot a single process 
do both? One reason is that cell activities can fluctuate within only a narrow dynamic range. Often 
input amplitudes can vaty over a much wider dynamic range. For example, if a large number of 
input pathways converge on a cell, then the number of active input pathways can vary greatly 
through time, and with it, the total size of the cell input. Owing to the small dynamic range of the 
cell, its activity could easily become saturated when a large number of inputs is active. If all the cells 
got saturated, then their activities could not sensitively represent the relative size, and thus 
importance, of their respective inputs. One way to prevent this would be to require that each 
individual input be chosen very small so that the sum of all inputs would not saturate cell activity. 
But such small individual inputs could easily be lost in cellular noise. The cell's small dynamic 
range could hereby make it insensitive to both small and large inputs as a result of noise and 
saturation, respectively, at the lower and upper extremes of the cell's dynamic range. This noise-
saturation dilemma faces all biological cells, not merely nerve cells. Interactions across a network 
of cells is needed to preserve information about the relative sizes of inputs to the cells in the 
network, and thereby overcome noise and saturation. This kind of pattern processing sacrifices 
information about the absolute amplitude of inputs in order to enable the cells to respond sensitively 
to their relative size, over a wide dynamic range. Since the pattern processing network discards 
information about absolute input size, a separate channel is needed to track information about the 
total amplitude, or 'energy', of the inputs. 
Retaining sensitivity to the relative size of inputs can be accomplished by on-center off-
surround interactions between cells that obey the membrane equations of neurophysiology'''·"'·"'. In 
a feedforward on-center, off-surround network, fcedforward inputs excite their target cells while 
inhibiting more distant cells. To store inputs temporarily in short-term (or working) memory, 
excitatory feedback between nearby cells and inhibitory feedback between more distant cells can 
solve the noise-saturation dilemma. Stated using more general terms, these networks define mass-
action interactions among short-range cooperative and longer-range competitive inputs or activities. 
The mass action terms of membrane equations introduce multiplication into brain arithmetic by 
multiplying cell inputs with cell voltages, or activities. Membrane equations respond to on-center 
off-surround interactions by dividing each cell's activity by a weighted sum of all the cell inputs (in 
a fecdforward interaction) or activities (in a feedback interaction) with which it interacts. This 
operation keeps cell activities away from the saturation range by normalizing them while preserving 
their sensitivity to input ratios. 
The ubiquitous nature of the noise-saturation dilemma in all cellular tissues clarifies why 
such on-center off-surround anatomies arc found throughout the brain. For example, when ratio 
processing and normalization occur during visual perception, they help to control brightness 
constancy and contrast"·'" as well as perceptual grouping and altention535'·8"·8'. At higher levels of 
cognitive processing, these mechanisms can provide a neural explanation of the 'limited capacity' 
of cognitive short-termmemory''8• 
The cooperative-competitive interactions that preserve cell sensitivity to relative input size 
also bind these cell activities into functional units. Indeed, relative activities need to be computed 
synchronously, and early theorems about short-term memory and long-term memory processing"' 
predicted an important role for synchronous processing between the interacting cells. Subsequent 
neuroBhysiological experiments have emphasized the functional importance of synchronous brain 
states 6•8 . More recent neural modeling has shown bow such synchronized activity patterns can, for 
example, quantitatively explain psychophysical data about temporal order judgments during 
perceptual grouping within the visual cortex88• 
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Motor expectation and volition 
Factorization of pattern and energy shows itself in many guises. For example, it helps to 
explain how motor expectations (pattern) interact with volitional speed signals (energy) to generate 
goal-directed arm movements89'91 , as during the computation of the Desired Velocity Vector in the 
cortical area 4 circuit of Figure 6. As noted in the discussion of 'where' and 'how' processing, a 
motor expectation represents where we want to move, such as to the position where our hand can 
grasp a desired object. Such a motor representation, or Target Position Vector (TPV), can prime a 
movement, or get us ready to make a movement, but by itself, it cannot release the movement55·89 • 
First the TPV needs to be converted into a Difference Vector (DV), which triggers an overt action 
only when a volitional signal90 that multiplicatively gates action read-out. The volitional signal for 
controlling movement speed is called a GO signal, as in Figure 6. The signal for controlling size is 
called a GRO signal. Neural models have predicted how such GO and GRO si7nals may, for 
example, alter the size and speed of handwritten script without altering its form9 • As noted in 
Figure 6, some motor expectations seem to be computed in the parietal and motor cortex. Volitional 
signals seem to be computed within the basal ganglia w•. 
The Vector Integration to Endpoint, or VITE, neural model, summarized in Figure 6, of how 
these arm-controlling pattern and energy factors combine within cortical areas 4 and 5 has been 
used to predict the functional roles of six identified cortical cell ty~es, and to quantitatively simulate 
their temporal responses during a wide range of behavioral tasks· 5•56 . These results support model 
hypotheses about how variable-speed and variable-force arm movements can be carried out in the 
presence of obstacles. The model hereby provides a detailed example of how task-sensitive 
volitional control of action realizes an overall separation into pattern and energy variables. 
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Figure 8. Schematic conditioning 
circuit: Conditioned stimuli (CS;) 
activate sensory categories (Sc5;), 
which compete among themselves for 
limited capacity short-term memory 
activation and storage. The activated 
Sc,1 representations, i = I, 2, elicit 
trainable signals to drive 
representations D and motor 
command representations M. 
Learning from a sensory 
representation Sc51 to a drive 
representation D is called conditioned 
reinforcer learning. Learning from D 
to a Sc51 is called incentive 
motivational learning. Signals from D 
to Sc51 arc elicited when the 
combination of conditioned sensory 
plus internal drive inputs is 
sufficiently large. Sensory 
representations that wm the 
and internal motivational signals can 
Cognitive-emotional intemctions and attentional blocking 
Cognitive-emotional learning enables sensory and cognitive events to acquire emotional and 
motivational significance. Both classical and instrumental conditioning can be used for this 
purpose92•95 • For example, during classical conditioning, an irrelevant sensory cue, or conditioned 
stimulus (CS), is paired with a reinforciug event, or unconditioned stimulus (US). The CS hereby 
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acquires some of the reinforcing properties of the US; it becomes a "conditioned reinforcer" with 
its own motivational properties. The manner in which the thalamocortical representation of a 
conditioned reinforcer CS is influenced by motivational signals represents, I suggest, another 
example of factorization of pattern and energy. Here, the activities across the thalamocortical 
representations of recently presented sensory events, including the CS, constitute the "pattern". 
This pattern is normalized by the feedback on-center off-surround interactions that are used to store 
the activities in short-term memory without saturation. If one or more of these sensory events is a 
conditioned reinforcer, then it can amplify its own activity via learned motivational feedback signals, 
which play the role of "energy" in this example45•67 • These amplified representations can, in turn, 
attentionally block94 , or inhibit, the representations of irrelevant sensory events via the off-surround 
of the feedback network. Attentional blocking is one of the key mechanisms whereby animals learn 
which consequences are causally predicted by their antecedent sensory cues and actions, and which 
consequences are merely accidental. A more detailed summary of how blocking is proposed to 
happen is now given. 
During cognitive-emotional learning, at least three types of internal representations interact: 
Sensor;' and cognitive representations (S), drive representations (D), and motor representations 
(M)45•6 , as depicted in Figure 8. The sensory representations S are thalamocortical representations 
of external events, like the ones described above within the 'what' processing stream. They include 
representations of CSs. D representations include the hypothalamic and amygdala circuits at which 
homeostatic and reinforcing cues converge to generate emotional reactions and motivational 
decisions"'·'". M re,presentations include cortical and cerebellar circuits for controlling discrete 
adaptive responses' ·99 • As noted above, the S representations represent the pattern information in 
this example. Tbey interact with one another via an on-center off-surround feedback network that 
stores their activities in short-term memory, while also solving the noise-saturation dilemma. The D 
representations supply modulatory energy owing to the action of the following types of learning 
processes: 
( l) 'Conditioned reinforcer learning' occurs in the S --> D pathways, and enables a sensory 
event, such as a conditioned stimulus CS, to become a conditioned reinforcer that can activate a 
drive representation D. This may be accomplished by pairing the CS with an unconditioned 
stimulus US. The CS activates its sensory representation S. The US activates its own sensory 
representation, which in turn activates the drive representation D. Adaptive weights in the S · ·> D 
pathway can grow in response to this correlated activity. Future presentations of the CS can hereby 
lead to activation of D, which controls various emotional and motivational responses. 
(2) Due to this pairing of CS and US, 'incentive motivational learning' can also occur in the 
adaptive weights within the D -> S pathway. This type of learning allows an activated drive 
representation D to prime, or modulate, the sensory representations S of all sensory events that have 
consistently been activated with it in the past. Speaking intuitively, these sensory events are 
motivationally compatible with D. 
(3) S ··--> M 'habit learning', or motor learning, trains the sensorimotor maps and gains that 
control appropriate and accurately calibrated responses to the CS. These processes include circuits 
such as those summarized in Figure 6. 
Conditioned reinforcer learning and incentive motivational learning combine to control 
attentional blocking in the following way. As noted above, the sensory representations S are the 
pattern variables that store sensory and cognitive representations in short-term memory using on-
center off-surround feedback networks. Due to the self-normalizing properties of these networks, 
the total activity that can be stored in short-term memory across the entire network is limited. This 
is thus, once again, an example of the noise-saturation dilemma. Due to activity normalization, 
sufficiently great activation of one sensory representation implies that other sensory representations 
cannot be stored in short-term memory. In the present example, conditioning of a CS to a US 
strengthens both its S --> D conditioned reinforcer and D --> S incentive motivational pathways. 
Thus, when a conditioned reinforcer CS activates its sensory representation S, learned S --> D --> S 
positive feedback quickly amplifies the activity of S. This S --> D --> S feedback pathway supplies 
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the motivational energy that focuses attention upon salient conditioned reinforcers. These amplified 
sensory representations inhibit the storage of other sensory cues in short-term memory via the 
lateral inhibition that exists among the sensory representations S. Blocking is hereby explained 
using incentive motivational "energy" to amplify conditioned reinforcer CS representations within 
the self-normalized sensory "pattern" that is stored in short-term memory. This S --> D -> S 
feedback causes a cognitive-emotional resonance to occur. The model prediction of how drive 
representations D, such as those in the amgydala, influence blocking by delivering incentive 
motivational feedback to thalamocmtical sensory representations has not yet been tested 
neurophysiologically. 
Rate-invariant speech and language understanding 
Factorization of pattern and energy also seems to play an important role in temporally 
organized cognitive processes such as speech and language. Here sequences of events are 
transformed into temporally evolving spatial patterns of activation that are stored within working 
memories 100. The 'pattern' information that is stored in working memory represents both the event 
itself-it's so-called iten1 information-and the temporal order in which the events occurred. The 
'energy' information encodes both the temporal rate and rhy!lun with which the events occur68 . 
Factorization of information about item and order from information about rate and rhythm helps us 
to understand speech that is spoken at variable rates: A rate-invariant representation of speech and 
language in working memory avoids the need to define multiple representations of the same speech 
and language utterance at evety conceivable rate. This representation can, in turn, be used to learn 
speech and language codes, or categories, that are themselves not too sensitive to speech rate. 
Because rate and rhythm information are substantially eliminated from the rate-invariant working 
memory representation, rate and rhythm need to be computed by a separate process. This is a 
problem of .filclorization, rather than of independent representation, because the speech rate and 
rhythm that arc perceived depend upon the categorical language units, such as syllables and words, 
that are familiar to the listener. What these language units are, in turn, depends upon how the 
listener bas learned to group together, and categorize, the temporally distributed speech and 
language features that have previously been stored in the rate-invariant working memory. 
Rate-mvariant working memories can be designed from specialized versions of the on-
center off-surround feedback networks that arc used to solve the noise-saturation dtlcmma67 68· 101 
In other words, the networks that are used to store spatially distributed feature patterns, without a 
loss of sensitivity to their identity and relative size, can be specialized to store temporally distributed 
events, without a loss of sensitivity to their identity and temporal order. The normalization of these 
stored activities is the basis for their rate-invariant properties. Thus, this model predicts that a 
process like discounting the illuminant, in the spatial domain, uses a variant of the same 
mechanisms that arc used to process rate-invariant speech, in the temporal domain. A key problem 
concerns how the rate-invariant working memory can maintain the same representation as the 
speech rate speeds up. The model predicts that the 'energy' information that is computed from the 
speech rate and rhythm can be used to automatically gain-control the processing rate of the working 
memory to maintain its rate-invariant speech properties"". In particular, the rate at which the 
working memory stores individual events needs to keep up with the overall rate at which successive 
speech sounds arc presented. A neural model of this process has been progressively developed to 
quantitatively simulate psychophysical data concerning the categorization of variable-rate speech by 
human subjects''·'"'·"", and to functionally interpret neurophysiological data that arc consistent 
with model properties"". In this model, the working memory interacts with a categorization network 
via bottom-up and top-down pathways, and conscious speech is a resonant wave that emerges 
through these interactions. 
Beyond modularity 
Much experimental evidence has supported the idea that the brain is organized into 
processing streams, but how these streams are determined and how they interact to generate 
behavior is still a topic of active research. This article has summarized some of the rapidly growing 
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empirical and theoretical evidence that our brains compute complementary operations within 
parallel pairs of processing streams. Table I summarizes some of the processes for which 
evidence of complementarity has been collected from behavioral and neural data and models. The 
variety of these behavioral processes provides some indication of the generality of this 
organizational principle in the brain. Interstream interactions are proposed to overcome 
complementmy processing deficiencies within each stream. Hierarchical interactions between the 
several levels of each processing stream are proposed to overcome informational uncertainties that 
occur at individual processing stages within that stream. Hierarchical intrastream interactions and 
parallel interstream interactions work together to generate behavioral properties that are free from 
these uncertainties and complementary insufficiencies. Such complementmy processing may occur 
on multiple scales of brain organization. 
Many experimentalists have described properties of functional specialization and integration 
in their neural data. Some neural modelers have attempted to characterize such properties using 
concepts about how the brain may work to achieve information maximization. Information, as a 
technical concept, is well defined for stationary information channels, or channels whose statistical 
properties tend to persist through time. In contrast, brains self-organize on a relatively fast time 
scale through development and life-long learning, and do so in response to nonstationary, or rapidly 
changing, statistical properties of their environments. I propose that hierarchical intrastream 
interactions and paralld interstream interactions bet ween complementary systems are a 
manifestation of this capacity for self-controlled and stable self-organization. This observation leads 
to my final remarks. 
How do complementary sets of properties arise, rather than some other combination of 
properties? How is the organization of smaller-scale complementary properties organized within 
larger-scale complementary properties? The simplest hypothesis, for which little direct experimental 
evidence is yet available, is that each pair of complementary processes represents two sides of a 
larger brain system. Complementarity could arise if, during brain development, precursors of the 
larger system bifurcated into complementary streams through a process of symmetry-breaking that 
operates on multiple scales of organization. In this view, complementary systems are an integral part 
of the self~organization process that enables the brain to adapt to a rapidly changing world. This 
view of brain development is not in conflict with prevailing views of specific developmental 
mechanisms'"'. Rather, it points to a global organizational principle that may be capable of 
coordinating them. 
Thus, just as in the organization of the physical world with which it interacts, it is proposed 
that the brain is organized to obey principles of complementarity, uncertainty, and symmetry-
breaking. In fact, it can be argued that known complementary properties exist because of the need to 
process complementary types of information in the environment. The processes that form 
perceptual boundaries and surfaces provide a particularly clear example of this hypothesis. The 
'complementary brain' may thus perhaps best be understood through analyses of the cycles of 
perception, cognition, emotion, and action whereby the brain is intimately linked to its physical 
environment through a continuously operating feedback cycle. One useful goal of future research 
may be to study more directly how complementary aspects of the physical world are translated into 
complementary brain designs for coping with this world. 
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